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butterflies with a year-round tropical environment. Total debt amounted to almost $16 million following the issuance of the bonds.
The Museum"s long-term chief executive officer (CEO), William Moynihan, retired in 2001. He was widely known and recognized as a skillful manager and an effective fund-raiser. His successor, Roger Bowen, served for only about one year and was acknowledged to be weaker at fundraising and relationship building than Moynihan. Terry Gaouette, the existing chief financial officer (CFO) at the time of Bowen"s departure, was named the Museum"s interim manager until a new CEO could be found. Action by the board of directors in April 2002 granted Gaouette the authority to sell and disburse assets from the Museum"s endowment fund without the benefit of any board approval, subject to the terms of the endowment policy.
A couple of months later the Museum"s board of directors also made Gaouette the acting chief operating officer (COO). When the COO job description was finalized in 2003, it required reporting to the CEO and the board of directors. In addition to his financial duties as CFO, Gaouette was responsible for Museum admissions, security, facilities, human resources, technology, and business development. Gaouette"s COO position was intended to be temporary pending the recruitment and hiring of the CEO. In late 2003 the board hired Michael Stafford, an archeologist, as the new CEO. Stafford, who had less than two years of administrative experience, was strong on relationships and fund-raising, but was self-acknowledged to be weak in operational and financial skills. The board of directors then balked when Stafford wanted to take the COO duties away from Gaouette in early 2004.
The Board of Directors
The Museum"s board of directors was comprised of 27 members; five appointed by the Milwaukee County Executive and four by the County Board Chairman. The remaining 18 members were elected by the Museum"s current board of directors. Table 1 contains the names and professional positions of the individuals serving on the board as of May 2005. Board committees included: executive, audit and finance, development, education programming, endowment, human resources, government affairs, and nominating. There were no term limits and the board did not discipline members who showed up infrequently for meetings . Eight of the members on the board in 2005 had joined prior to 2000. In 2001, the board lost an important long-standing director, Sheldon Lubar, who resigned when he agreed to run a $25 million fund-raising drive for the new Santiago Calatrava-designed Milwaukee Art Museum.
The board of directors usually met six times per year and approximately two-thirds of the members were present at the meetings held during the 2002 through 2004 period. Meetings ran about 90 minutes and many board members only participated by telephone. Typical board meeting agendas included a discussion of the Museum"s financial status with a focus on attendance statistics and other revenue-related indicators. Board members received in advance a detailed packet outlining key items to be discussed at the meetings.
Minutes of the board meetings held from 2002 through 2004 did not disclose any particular concerns about the Museum"s financial condition other than minor budget modifications. There was little discussion or concern about the use of endowment funds, increases in the line of credit, liquidation of investments, or the decline in the Museum"s total net assets. When the Museum"s board met in June 2003 to consider the ambitious budget for the 2004 fiscal year beginning in September, only eight members were present in the room with seven more members participating by telephone. Some late-arriving board members missed most of the budget presentation, which was the largest and most aggressive in the Museum"s history. The entire budget was approved within 60 minutes without any change.
The chair of the Audit and Finance committee was the managing director of the Museum"s major lender . Another board member was the president of the Museum"s second largest creditor bank. Other board members included attorneys who worked for firms who did legal work for the Museum. The County"s auditors determined that since 2002, key Museum meetings violated the state"s open meeting law with the board often failing to disclose why it had convened in closed session. Minutes of closed session meetings were often imprecise as to the nature of the discussions. 
The Endowment
The Endowment Committee consisted of five board members that met on average twice per year during the 2002 through 2004 period. Attendance at the committee meetings averaged about 70 percent. The committee was responsible for overseeing the endowment policy that called for an annual disbursement of three percent of the endowment funds for Museum operations, which could be increased to five percent if there were sufficient funds to cover current debt obligations. Unlike other organizations, the Museum"s endowment funds were maintained in the Museum"s general operating fund account . Minutes of the meetings reflected a focus on portfolio allocation, management of the funds, fees charged by the fund managers, and distribution of the income generated by the investments. Exhibit The Museum"s financial staff was made aware of the error ten minutes prior to the meeting by the investment consultant, but did not point out the mistake to the committee. Minutes of the January 2005 meeting also contained a discussion of the need for the Museum"s board to address liquidity and working capital needs. When asked later about the withdrawal of money from the endowment, Gaouette said he expected it would be repaid from Museum earnings when attendance improved. Earnings in fiscal year 2005 did not improve, which Museum officials blamed on the local economy and freeway reconstruction in downtown Milwaukee. They also cited increased medical costs as a reason for not meeting their budget goals.
The Financial Crisis
The Board also had a 13-member Executive Committee that met on average five times per year during the 2002 through 2004 period. Attendance at the committee meetings averaged about 75 percent, with many members participating by telephone. The meeting minutes contained only sporadic discussion of the Museum"s deteriorating cash position and most of the committee"s time appeared to be spent on planning for future growth and expansion.
A six-member Audit and Finance Committee typically met twice each year with the first meeting devoted to reviewing and formally adopting the budget and the second meeting focusing on a review of the audited financial statements. Attendance at the committee meetings averaged about 80 percent for the three years preceding 2005. Minutes from the meetings indicated that the external accounting firm had met with the committee each year to present the results of the annual audit. In January 2004, the committee was briefed on the 2003 financial audit, which highlighted two areas of concern. First, the external auditors noted that the Museum had experienced a total net asset loss for two consecutive years. Second, the auditors stated that "liquidity issues and cash flow management had required management"s attention."
By March 2004, the banks had placed a general lien on all of the Museum"s assets. Stafford, Gaouette, and the Museum board"s secretary/treasurer had signed a security agreement with the banks that committed "all inventory, revenues, rents, profits, income and receipts derived in any fashion from all sources…as collateral for credit extended." Board and committee minutes during this period do not indicate that board members were aware of this action (Murphy, 2005 . The unanticipated news of the magnitude of the 2004 loss was of particular concern to County officials because they had been told by Gaouette to expect a deficit of about $450,000. Although the County Board approved the new agreement and subsidy in March 2005, the final documents had not yet been executed when the Museum"s financial problems were publicly acknowledged. County officials were disturbed to find that, within two months after negotiations, the Museum was in danger of not making payroll payments to its employees. County Board members demanded an audit be performed of the Museum"s past and present financial condition.
In June 2005, the County"s Audit Department submitted an interim report on the Museum"s financial condition. The report was highly critical of the Museum"s current public accounting firm, noting that "although a draft of the audited financial statements was provided to Museum, the final report had not been issued as of 283 days after the end of fiscal year." The report also criticized the Museum"s accounting adjustment of over $2 million of pension liabilities for former County employees back to County as being "without foundation." The report indicated that during a meeting in February 2005, Gaouette had stated unequivocally to County staff that the Museum"s pension obligation was "fully funded." To the contrary, the County Audit Department concluded that the pension obligation was unfunded and should have appeared as a liability on the Museum"s balance sheet. Although the County Audit Department did not issue a set of financial statements, their report estimated a $5.4 million net asset loss for the fiscal year 2004. The report also estimated the net asset loss for the first quarter of fiscal year 2005 was $2.2 million and that the total assets in the Museum"s endowment fund were under $400,000. The audit also revealed that in March 2005 an investment banking firm was hired as "turnaround consultants" by the Museum"s management at the request of its creditor banks. The investment bankers projected that, on an annualized basis, the Museum would lose over $7 million from normal operations in fiscal year 2005.
The county audit spread the blame widely for the Museum's dire financial straits and stated that the failure of the institution to tell county officials about its problems before a vote on a new subsidy agreement in March 2005 was a "violation of the public trust." The audit indicated that financial problems were known to Museum managers for at least a year before the March 2005 vote by the County Board on a new partnership deal (Here, 2005). The audit also claimed that Museum officials were reassuring the county about its financial situation in the run-up to the vote even while they were negotiating with their bankers and working on a plan to slash expenses and staff. Two days after the audit was released in June 2005, Stafford announced his resignation and two weeks later the board chairman resigned his position. Following the resignations, County Executive Scott Walker called for a criminal probe of the Museum"s debacle by the State of Wisconsin"s Attorney General.
David Messiner, the Museum board's chairman attributed the unexpected size of the deficit "to overly ambitious budgeting, fund-raising shortfalls and the county's refusal to administer pension benefits for some excounty employees." He also noted that the final audit of the Museum"s 2004 fiscal-year financial statements had not been completed in a timely manner. Stafford commented that Museum "grew too fast, too quickly, and it grew beyond its means of support." In June 2005 the Museum laid off 56 of its 240 staff members to partially contain the deficit.
In June 2005, a new five-person oversight board, which contained no existing directors or officers, was created by Milwaukee County officials to direct the Museum. This occurred as a result of the county and the lenders reaching an agreement that provided the Museum with $6 million of new guaranteed debt. The agreement reached with the lenders by Milwaukee County called for a reduction in the Museum"s annual operating budget from $22 million to $13 million. By the beginning of July 2005, the Museum had laid off many of its experienced collections and research staff and had begun the process of preparing to sell off assets that were not a part of the "exhibit experience." Milwaukee County Executive Walker suggested that the museum"s celebrated 700-acre Tirimbina rain forest preserve in Costa Rica be among the assets sold.
How did this once renowned organization become a shell of its former self? What financial management and governance mistakes were made, if any, and how could this crisis have been prevented? What can be done to restore the Museum to its former self? These are the questions that the Museum"s new oversight board faced when they met for the first time in July 2005.
Teaching Notes: The Financial Collapse Of The Milwaukee Public Museum
CASE DESCRIPTION
his case is about the Milwaukee Public Museum, Inc., a non-profit private corporation. Founded in 1882, the Milwaukee Public Museum became a private non-profit corporation in 1992. The case focuses on events which occurred during the period 2003-2005 when the Museum experienced severe financial difficulties. The case involves the financial problems experienced by the Museum during this period. These financial problems raised a number of important issues. These include the following: (1) the use of endowment funds and the monitoring and control of these funds; (2) the relationship between the museum management and the Board of Directors; (3) the appropriate organizational structure in such a setting; (4) individual interactions and abilities of the people involved; (5) oversight responsibilities and due diligence of the Board of Directors; and (6) implications of the problems for people who depend upon the Museum, including employees and the community at large. This case can be used to discuss a variety of financial issues related to both for-profit and non-profit organizations. These include institutional and legal issues related to the management and use of endowment funds, corporate governance issues related to the role of the board in financial matters, ethical and legal issues related to financial disclosure, the financial management of a museum with separate operational entities, and operational management of a museum. This case would be appropriate for both undergraduate seniors with an interest in finance, as well as MBA students with an interest in finance and/or non-profit organizations. The case does not require an extensive background in finance, but rather a familiarity with some basic financial techniques and accounting terminology. Some familiarity with income statements and balance sheets is also required. It would also be preferable but not necessary that students have some prior exposure to investments.
The case can be adequately discussed in a 1 to 1-1/2 hour classroom period. This could be extended if more of the many related issues are discussed. Perhaps the instructor may want to provide some general introduction to non-profits and the use and role of endowment funds. One may want to discuss some of the interpersonal and/or organizational structure issues which the case addresses. Students will probably need to spend 3 to 5 hours preparing the case. This would involve reading the case, identifying and thinking about many of the important issues raised, doing some financial analysis and providing some kind of solution to the case. If a written report is required these may increase the preparation time by 50 percent.
CASE SYNOPSIS
This case is about severe fiscal problems which occurred during the period 2003 to 2005 at the highly respected Milwaukee Public Museum, a non-profit corporation which receives an annual subsidy from Milwaukee County. It is presented in a manner that allows the students to see how quickly bad things can happen to good organizations. Although this case focuses primarily on the financial difficulties at the Museum, it does raise an extremely wide variety of other issues which can be discussed. These include issues such as corporate governance, ethics, disclosure, organizational structure, interpersonal interactions, the use of endowment funds, the role and responsibilities of Board members, and the impact on the public at large. It also allows the instructor to expose students to the operational difficulties of non-profits and recognize that even these organizations can have dire operational and financial problems. Another attractive feature of the case is that it does not require a high degree of financial sophistication, but rather much more critical thinking and analysis. It does require one to be familiar with T financial statements and basic accounting terminology. Finally, the fact that this is a one of the largest most prestigious museums in the country with a long and distinguished history allows students to identify and sympathize with the situation almost immediately. The case should be of interest to a wide variety of business students.
SUGGESTIONS AND CASE QUESTIONS
This case can be presented in class in order to introduce students to a number of issues which have already been mentioned above. Not all of these issues can be discussed at length in a normal one hour class. Consequently, discussion of the case can be done effectively in a number of different formats. In a broad sense this case raises two areas for discussion: governance, along with the related agency issues, and operational and financial problems for a non-profit museum. One format would be to discuss both areas extensively in one 2-hour class or two 1-hour classes. Another format would be to discuss one of the areas extensively in a 1-hour class. A third format would be to discuss both issues simultaneously but in less detail in a 1-hour class.
Notes: Governance and Related Agency Issues
In this case the problems experienced by the Museum can be traced to a variety of agency problems and governance issues. As a non-profit corporation, the Museum had no shareholders, yet Milwaukee County guaranteed the revenue bond issues used to fund the museum. Because of fiscal constraints during the recession of 2001-02, the County did not monitor the Museum"s operations or audit the books on an on-going basis. As a consequence, there was no oversight coming from sources which appear naturally in most corporations. Because the debt was guaranteed by the County, the bondholders did not concern themselves with the financial condition of the Museum. This lack of external oversight put an additional emphasis on the role and responsibilities of the Board of Directors which oversaw the Museum. However, Board member activity appears to have been operating at the low end of the spectrum. Board attendance was low and much of the meeting participation was conducted via the telephone. In addition, two of the Board"s most influential members were high level officers in the Museum"s creditor banks.
There were a number of other contributing circumstances to the financial crisis that appeared because of poor Board decisions. First, the new CEO, Stafford, an archaeologist by experience and training, was a self-acknowledged business and financial neophyte. Consequently, the Board could not depend upon the most important person in the Museum for sound and reliable business and financial information and judgment. To offset Stafford"s managerial deficiencies, the Board created a structure that had the CFO reporting directly to both the CEO and the Board. Thus, the relationship between the Board, CEO, and CFO was highly unusual and no doubt resulted in mixed messages regarding the Museum"s financial condition. To further complicate matters, the CFO also served as the COO, despite the CEO recommendation to separate the two positions. This may have led to a conflict of interests and additional pressures on the relationship between the CEO and CFO. Also, with one person serving as the both CFO and COO there was no effective "checks and balances" built into the system. The above matters may be related to additional problems. The Museum changed external accounting firms in 2004 and the new firm had not provided audited financial statements in a timely manner. Un-audited statements existed within five months of the fiscal year end, but final statements had not been issued as the oversight board began its during in July 2005 -10 months after the end of the fiscal year. In addition, the outside investment consulting firm provided the wrong financial statements regarding the Museum"s endowment fund. Instead of the Endowment Committee reviewing the December 2004 ending investment balances, they were accidentally given two year old statements. Interestingly, about 10 minutes before the Endowment Committee met to review the statement, the CFO was notified of mix-up and decided to present the outdated numbers without informing the committee members. Given the dramatic increase in the investment balance from August 2004 to December 2004, members of the committee should have caught the error. In any event, the failure of the investment consulting firm and the CFO to inform the members of the Endowment Committee of the error is inexcusable. If the correct figures were presented at the meeting it is likely that members would have seen that the fund balances had dropped by several million dollars. Questions by committee members would have hopefully brought to light that the CFO was funding the Museum"s mounting operating losses with withdraws from the investment fund -an action that was in direct violation of the endowment policy that only allowed for a five percent annual draw.
An examination of the income statements reveals increasing revenues for the IMAX theatre, restaurant, and gift shop departments; however, these usual "profit centers" generally were not producing positive results. The cumulative loss of the retail store was significant and an indication of an inefficient operation. Even the IMAX theater, usually a museum "cash cow," produced a net loss in 2003 In 2004, a dramatic increase in grant expenditures was realized and at the same time pension liabilities of the Museum were removed arbitrarily and unilaterally by the CFO. The unaudited financial statements indicated a $2.5 million loss in 2004, which was actually understated due to the endowment withdrawals and change in pension expenses. By the later portion of calendar year 2004, almost $500,000 per month was being withdrawn from the endowment to cover operating shortfalls. The Museum"s endowment balance was about $6 million in 2003, but by April 2005 the endowment was estimated by the County to be only $350,000. The endowment had been essentially drained, despite a policy which limited withdrawals to only 5 percent per year.
The Peer Group Museum financial data was provided in the case for fiscal year 2003. The Milwaukee Museum"s debt ratio was more than 3 times larger than any of its peers and the current and quick ratios were far below the peer averages. The peer group comparison also showed that management and fundraising expenses were significantly higher which helped contribute to the heavy losses. On the other hand, the peer group comparisons on the revenue side do not suffer such a disparity. As discussed above, the Museum"s losses in its departmental operations (i.e. restaurants, retail shop, and IMAX theatre) were quite disturbing -especially compared to the peer group. Looking at the peer group balance sheet comparisons, one can see the Museum"s large amount of debt (discussed above) and the very low level of long-term endowment relative to the others. The Museum"s endowment fund was approximately one-tenth of it"s peers.
In summary, it appears that the source of the Museum"s financial difficulties was two-fold. First, Museum expenses were too high relative to its peers; especially for its departmental operations. Secondly, the Museum"s endowment fund was inadequate to support the growth that was taking place in the Museum"s operations. While Museum staff cuts took place almost immediately in June 2005, it remains to be seen whether adequate external contributions will be forthcoming to adequately support the Museum operations. The financial situation at the time of the case was extremely dire and the Museum"s future was uncertain. The Museum"s new five-member oversight board faced a substantial challenge when they met for the first time in July 2005 to work on a plan to save the institution.
Questions for Classroom Discussion
The following are questions about the case which can be used for discussion in a classroom setting or assigned to students as written work or presentation in class:
1.
What were the strengths and weaknesses of the Museum"s new CEO and how did this CEO differ from previous leaders? Did the CEO"s lack of financial and operational sophistication set the stage for the problems which arose?
